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Classical liberalism emphasizes the importance of individual liberty and contemporary (or 
welfare) liberalism tends to emphasize some kind of material equality. The best known form of 
libertarianism—right-libertarianism—is a version of classical liberalism, but there is also form of 
libertarianism—left-libertarianism—that combines the classical liberal concern for individual 
liberty with the contemporary liberal concern for a robust concern for material equality. In this 
paper, I shall assess whether libertarianism in general—and left-libertarianism in particular—can 
judge a state to be just without the universal consent of those it governs. 
Although Robert Nozick has argued, in Anarchy, State, and Utopia1, that libertarianism is 
compatible with the justice of a minimal state—even if does not arise from universal consent—
few have been persuaded.2 Libertarianism holds that individuals have very strong rights of non-
interference and all non-pacifist versions thereof hold that they also have strong enforcement 
rights. Given that these rights are typically understood as protecting choices, it is very difficult to 
see how a non-consensual state could be just. Those who have not consented to the state’s 
powers retain their enforcement rights, and the state violates their rights when it uses force 
against them to stop them from correctly and reliably enforcing their rights. 
I will outline a different way of establishing that a non-consensual libertarian state can be 
just. I will show that a state can—with a few important qualifications—justly enforce the rights 
of citizens and extract payments from wrongdoers to cover the costs of such enforcement. 
Moreover, certain versions of left-libertarianism—unlike right-libertarianism—can justly 
redistribute resources to the poor and invest in infrastructure to overcome market failures. 
 2 
 I should emphasize that my goal is rather modest. I shall merely sketch a possible 
libertarian position that recognizes the justice of significant state activity. Although I believe that 
this version is indeed plausible, I shall not attempt here to defend its plausibility. 
 
I. JUSTICE AND THE STATE 
The term “justice” is used in several different ways. Sometimes it designates the moral 
permissibility of political structures (such as legal systems). Sometimes it designates moral 
fairness (as opposed to efficiency or other considerations that are relevant to moral 
permissibility). Sometimes it designates legitimacy in the sense of it not being morally 
permissible for others to interfere forcibly. Finally, sometimes it designates what we owe each 
other in the sense of respecting everyone’s rights. This is the concept of justice to which I shall 
appeal. It can be understood broadly to include duties we owe ourselves (if there are any) or 
narrowly to exclude such duties. In the present context, this distinction doesn’t matter, since 
agents of the state will not normally violate their own rights in their official capacity.3 For 
simplicity, I will therefore understand justice broadly. The justness of the state is thus a matter of 
the extent to which it operates without violating anyone’s rights.  
I shall focus on a threshold conception of justice according to which a state is just if and 
only if it violates rights as rarely as can be reasonably expected of humans in general. Justice in 
this sense is compatible with occasional violation of rights. I focus on the threshold concept 
because states are run by humans and humans are fallible. It is thus inevitable that states will 
sometimes (e.g., inadvertently) violate someone’s rights. Justice in the above threshold sense 
only requires that such activities be sufficiently rare relative to what is reasonably feasible for 
humans. 
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It’s important to note that the justness of a state does not conceptually guarantee that it 
has any political authority over citizens in the sense that individuals in its territory typically have 
at least a pro tanto moral obligation to obey its dictates. Ideally, a state should have political 
authority, but it is not conceptually necessary for justice. Just as an individual citizen can behave 
justly without having any political authority over others, so to can the state (or agents thereof). 
Consequently, we shall not be concerned here with the important issue of political authority.4 
A state, then, is just, in our sense, if and only if, at least typically, it violates no one’s 
rights, but what is a state? Defining statehood is no easy matter, and there is no uncontroversial 
comprehensive definition. Something like the following, however, seems at least roughly right 
for our purposes: A state is a rule-of-law-based coercive organization that, for a given territory, 
effectively rules all individuals in it and claims a monopoly on the use of force. This can be 
unpacked as follows: An organization is coercive just in case it prohibits at least some activities, 
threatens to use force against individuals who do not comply with its dictates, and generally 
implements its threats. A coercive organization is rule-of-law-based just in case (roughly) it uses 
force only in a reasonably impartial and reliable manner for the violation of dictates that are 
reasonably knowable in advance (e.g., public, clear, and stable dictates) and for which violation is 
reasonably avoidable (e.g., because the dictates are not retroactive and compliance is not 
unreasonably difficult). An organization effectively rules the individuals of a given territory just in 
case those individuals generally conform to its dictates (in the sense of obeying them in part because 
the organization issued the dictates). An organization claims a monopoly on the use of force just in 
case it prohibits the use of force (or credible threat thereof) without its permission.5 
I shall show that almost all forms of libertarianism can recognize certain kinds of state as 
just. Following that, I shall show that a certain form of left-libertarianism can view reasonably 
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robust states as just. First, however, we need to clarify the nature of libertarianism.  
 
II. LIBERTARIANISM 
Libertarianism can be advocated as a full theory of moral permissibility or merely as a theory of 
justice (i.e., what rights individuals have). The difference concerns impersonal duties (duties 
owed to no one).6 Impersonal duties are duties that are not the correlates of any right. Because 
libertarianism is a purely rights-based theory (i.e., entails that someone has a duty only if it 
corresponds to a right that someone has), it does not specify any impersonal duties. Thus, if there 
are impersonal duties, libertarianism is mistaken as a full theory of morality. Although I would 
argue that there are no impersonal duties, we shall not consider that issue here. Instead, we shall 
simply take libertarianism—as effectively all libertarians do—to be a theory of justice. So 
understood, libertarianism is only concerned with interpersonal duties and is silent on whether 
there are any impersonal duties. 
Libertarianism is sometimes advocated as a derivative set of rules (e.g., on the basis of 
rule utilitarianism or contractarianism). Here, however, I reserve the term for the natural rights 
doctrine that agents initially fully own themselves. Agents are full self-owners just in case they 
own themselves in just the same way that they can fully own inanimate objects. Stated slightly 
differently, full self-owners own themselves in the same way that a full chattel-slave-owner owns 
a slave. Throughout, we are concerned with moral ownership and not legal ownership. 
Full self-ownership consists of full private ownership of one’s person (e.g., body). Full 
private ownership of an object consists of a full set of the following ownership rights: (1) control 
rights over the use of the object (liberty-rights to use it and claim-rights against others using it), 
(2) rights to transfer these rights to others (by sale, rental, gift, or loan), and (3) immunity to non-
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consensual loss of any of these rights as long as one has not violated anyone else’s rights. Full 
private ownership also includes some bundle of: (4) rights to compensation if someone uses the 
object without one’s permission, (5) enforcement rights (rights to use force to prevent the 
violation of these rights or to extract compensation owed for past violation), and (6) immunities 
to the non-consensual loss when one has violated the rights of others (i.e., limits on what rights 
one loses as the result of a rights violation). Because these last three rights are in tension with 
each other, the concept of full ownership is indeterminate with respect what mix of these last 
three rights is required. At one extreme is the view that full owners have an absolute immunity to 
the non-consensual loss of their rights (even if they violate the rights of others). This view entails 
that full owners do not have any rights of compensation or enforcement (since those rights 
require that those who violate their rights lose some of their control rights and thus not have an 
absolute immunity). At the other extreme is the view that individuals have some kind of absolute 
rights to compensation and enforcement (e.g., may kill a person to stop her from touching their 
car). This view entails that full owners have very minimal immunities to loss when they violate 
the rights of others.7 
One possible version of libertarianism, then, is radical pacifist libertarianism, which 
holds that individuals have absolute immunities to losing any of their self-ownership claim rights 
against others using their person. As a result, they hold that it is never permissible to use force 
against another individual without her permission. Because all states use, or threaten to use, 
force, radical pacifist libertarians deny that any state can be just.8  
Another possible—but implausible—version of libertarianism holds that individuals have 
certain rights of enforcement, but no individual, or group of individuals, has any right to enforce 
someone else’s rights. I may use force to stop you from assaulting me or to recover 
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compensation from you after you have assaulted me, but this does not justify anyone else’s use 
of force against you for this purpose. To do so would violate your rights on this view. On this 
view, individuals do not have the moral power to authorize the use of force by others against 
their aggressors. Like radical pacifism, this version of libertarianism precludes the justness of a 
state. All versions of libertarianism hold that it is unjust to use force to stop activities that violate 
no one’s libertarian rights. The view under consideration also holds that it is also unjust to use 
force to stop activities that do violate someone else’s libertarian rights. This leaves no room for 
just state activity. 
In what follows, we’ll set aside these two positions, and focus solely on non-pacifist 
versions of libertarianism that permit third parties to enforce the rights of individuals with the 
consent of those individuals. I will show that such versions of libertarianism can judge certain 
kinds of states to be just. 
All forms of libertarianism endorse full self-ownership. They differ with respect to the 
moral powers that individuals have to acquire ownership of external things. The best-known 
versions of libertarianism are right-libertarian theories, which hold that agents have a very 
strong moral power to acquire full private property in external things. Left-libertarians, by 
contrast, hold that natural resources (e.g., space, land, minerals, air, and water) belong to 
everyone in some egalitarian manner and thus cannot be appropriated without the consent of, or 
significant payment to, the members of society. 
In what follows, I shall restrict my attention to unilateralist versions of libertarianism, 
which are those versions that allow agents, under certain conditions, to use and appropriate 
unowned resources without the collective approval of others. All versions of right libertarianism 
are unilateralist—as are almost all versions of left-libertarianism (because they allow 
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appropriation without approval as long as an appropriate payment is made; see below). The only 
articulated form of libertarianism that this rules out is joint-ownership left-libertarianism, which 
holds that natural resources belong to everyone collectively and thus that appropriation—and 
perhaps (much more radically) even use—requires collective consent of some sort (e.g., majority 
or unanimity). This form of libertarianism makes it relatively easy to justify state activity—since 
all will consent to allowing some kind of state-protected private property rights—but it is not 
very plausible. Any minimally plausible version of libertarianism will allow some appropriation 
without the consent of others, and I shall therefore focus solely on unilateralist versions. 
 
III. GENERAL LIBERTARIAN LIMITS ON THE STATE 
Below, I will argue that (given our background assumptions) libertarianism in general—and a 
certain version of left-libertarianism in particular—leaves some significant room for just state 
activity. First, however, let us briefly identify the kinds of state activities that all forms of 
(unilateralist) libertarianism condemn as unjust—except, of course, where in accordance with a 
consensual agreement or in response to the violation of someone’s rights (which qualifications I 
leave implicit in what follows). Because different versions of libertarianism can take different 
positions on the ownership of external resources (i.e., resources other than the bodies and minds 
of agents), it is difficult to generalize about the libertarian limits on state restrictions on the use 
of such resources. All versions of libertarianism, however, endorse full self-ownership, and I 
shall therefore focus on the limits that this places on just state activity. 
 First, all libertarians judge it unjust for the state to use force to make individuals promote 
(by personal service) a merely impersonal good. Merely impersonal goods are that features of the 
world that are morally desirable, but not in virtue of being good for any individual (e.g., perhaps 
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the preservation of cultural artifacts when this benefits no one). Because libertarians—like most 
people—hold that failing to promote merely impersonal goods violates no one’s rights, they hold 
that the state violates rights of self-ownership, if it uses force to make someone promote such 
goods. All libertarians thus condemn as unjust the state’s use of force for this purpose. 
Second, effectively all libertarians condemn as unjust the use of force against a person for 
her own benefit but against her will (i.e., strong paternalism). Here we must distinguish between 
two ways that the rights in general—and those of self-ownership in particular—can be 
understood. Rights can be understood in choice-protecting terms or in interest-protecting terms. 
Almost all libertarians endorse self-ownership understood in choice-protecting terms. So 
understood, only valid consent can waive a right of self-ownership (e.g., make it permissible for 
you to touch me) or transfer a right from me to you (e.g., as in the case of a binding contract to 
perform personal services for you). It is possible, however, to endorse self-ownership in interest-
protecting terms. So understood, using force against a person without her consent need not 
violate her self-ownership, if it is not against her interests. Thus, for example, it may not violate 
a person’s self-ownership to forcibly prevent her from smoking, when this use of force is 
genuinely in her self-interest. Like most libertarians, I believe that the interest-protecting 
conception of rights licenses far too much paternalism.9 
Unlike many libertarians, however, I believe that the choice-protecting conception is too 
restrictive. It is incompatible with young children having any rights, and, without some fancy 
footwork, judges that a person’s self-ownership is violated when I push her to the ground without 
her permission to prevent her from being hit by a car. A more promising account, I believe, is a 
hybrid account according to which rights protect both interests and choices—with the protection 
of choices being lexically prior. More specifically, I would defend the following conception: a 
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person has a claim-right against others that they not perform action X if and only if it is wrong 
for others to perform X when (1) she has validly dissented from their X-ing (i.e., communicated 
her opposition to their X-ing), or (2) she has not validly consented to their X-ing and their X-ing 
is against her interests (on some appropriate conception of interest). If self-ownership is so 
understood, then the use of force to benefit a person without her consent sometimes may not 
violate her rights: namely, when it is not against her interests and she has not dissented (e.g., 
pushing someone to the ground to prevent her from being hit by a car).10 
In what follows, I shall assume that the rights of self-ownership protect choices in the 
above hybrid sense. This assumption, we shall see, does some important work below. One 
immediate implication is that it is unjust to use force against a person for his own benefit but 
against his will (although it may sometimes be permissible to use such force without his 
consent).11 
Third, all libertarians condemn as unjust the state’s use of force to make a person provide 
personal services for the benefit of others—assuming, as we are, that the individual has not 
violated anyone’s rights. Most people agree that it is unjust for the state to force people to clean 
the houses of the needy, but libertarianism’s claim is much more radical. It holds that it is unjust 
for the state to force individuals to serve in the military, to serve on juries, or even to testify in 
court cases. Of course, there may be ways to soften this implication. Perhaps, it is not unjust for 
the state to provide incentives to individuals to so serve (e.g., tax breaks or extra government 
services). Nonetheless, libertarianism has fairly radical views on this topic. 
Fourth and finally, all libertarians judge it unjust for the state to use force to prevent 
individuals from exercising their enforcement rights (e.g., using suitable force to prevent 
someone from violating one of their rights). As we have noted, libertarianism is compatible with 
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different views about what enforcement rights individuals have, but all forms (even radical 
pacifism) agree that, whatever rights these are, it is unjust for the state (or others) to interfere 
forcibly with their proper exercise. Moreover, this applies even when the enforcement rights are 
applied against agents of the state. Assuming (as we are) that individuals have at least some 
enforcement rights, an otherwise innocent agent violates no rights when she properly applies 
those rights (e.g., uses the minimal force necessary to prevent her rights from being violated) 
against agents of the state who are (1) attempting to (falsely) arrest her, or (2) attempting forcibly 
to prevent her from correctly exercising her enforcement rights against others. It is a violation of 
her self-ownership—and hence unjust—for the state to intervene forcibly in such cases. 
Given our background assumptions, no state is just according to libertarianism if it 
engages in the above kinds of activities. Can a state nonetheless be deemed just by some versions 
of libertarianism if it carefully avoids such activities? I shall argue that it can. 
Libertarianism holds that individuals have—in virtue of their self-ownership and property 
rights in external things—various liberty-rights, claim-rights of non-interference, and powers to 
transfer these rights to others. If everyone consensually transfers some of these rights to each 
other so as to create a state, and the state fulfills all its so generated obligations, then the state is 
just—no matter what it is like. Even a highly communistic state could be just in principle. Thus, 
universal mutual consent is one uncontroversial, uninteresting, and very unlikely way that a state 
can be just according to libertarianism. 
Even if no one transfers enforcement powers to the state, a state can be just according to 
(a given version of) libertarianism, if its dictates have the right content and the state is 
sufficiently reliable in enforcing its dictates. Call a state a libertarian private-law state just in 
case (1) it prohibits (and enforces) only activities (a) that violate someone’s libertarian rights, (b) 
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for which the victim has a libertarian right to enforce those rights, and (c) for which the state has 
a libertarian liberty to enforce (e.g., because the victim has consented to enforcement on her 
behalf); and (2) it respects the libertarian rights of all (including any derivative contractual 
obligations that it may owe). Although such a state claims a monopoly on the use of force, it is 
very restrictive in what it prohibits. As a result, if it enforces its prohibitions reliably, such a state 
will only rarely violate anyone’s libertarian rights and will be, according to libertarianism, a 
(sufficiently) just state. 
A libertarian private-law state is much less extensive than any modern state. Indeed, it is 
much weaker than the “night-watchman” state that some libertarians (e.g., Nozick) are willing to 
defend. Here we can briefly note some of its key features. One is that it may not involve any 
public criminal law. First, the state prohibits only activities that violate someone’s libertarian 
rights and it does not enforce anyone’s rights against his will. If all those who have had their 
rights violated by a given action waive their enforcement rights, the state does not pursue the 
matter. Second, unless one holds—implausibly in my view—that libertarianism recognizes 
certain “crimes against society” (e.g., murder, assault, theft), the members of society in general 
have no enforcement rights with respect to some specific rights violations, except as authorized 
by specific individual victims. Thus, for example, if the person assaulted waives enforcement 
rights, the state does not pursue the matter.12 (Of course, murder, where the victim no longer 
exists, requires some special treatment, but I shall not attempt that here.)  
Note also that, under a libertarian private-law state, individuals maintain the right to 
enforce their rights on their own—without any role for the state. A libertarian private-law state, 
that is, does not require that individuals use its enforcement procedures. It merely requires that 
individuals use enforcement procedures that it has authorized (and thus indeed claims a 
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monopoly on the use of force). Because it authorizes all libertarian self-enforcement procedures, 
the libertarian private-law state violates no one’s libertarian rights in imposing such a 
requirement. 
A libertarian private-law state can exist and be just without anyone irrevocably 
consensually transferring any enforcement rights to the state. Its justness thus does not require 
anyone’s consent in this sense. Nonetheless, on a standard choice-protecting conception of rights 
(to be addressed in the next section), the justice of any particular use of force by a libertarian 
private-law state against a particular person requires (something like) either (1) his consent or (2) 
where he has violated someone else’s rights, the consent of that victim (given her enforcement 
rights). There is thus a weak sense in which the justice of a libertarian private-law state depends 
on the consent of at least some of those governed. Below, I shall identify a hybrid conception of 
enforcement rights that will sever this dependency. 
We have not yet dealt with the issue of how a libertarian private-law state is financed. We 
know that it respects libertarian property rights, but, on this issue, the various versions of 
libertarianism disagree on what kind of taxation, if any, is allowed. I will now argue that a 
libertarian private-law state can be financed by forcibly extracting the costs of enforcement from 
those that violate rights. Following that, I will argue that, according to a certain form of left-
libertarianism, a libertarian private-law state can also involve significant taxation for the purpose 
of promoting equality of opportunity and for financing of certain goods and services that the 
market fails to provide. 
 
IV. ENFORCEMENT RIGHTS 
As indicated above, libertarianism is compatible with a wide range of views concerning 
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enforcement rights. We have set aside two possible views: (1) radical pacificism, which denies 
that individuals have any enforcement rights, and (2) pure self-enforcement versions, which hold 
that third parties have no rights to enforce an individual’s rights, even with her consent. We shall 
now examine more carefully the conditions under which third parties in general—and the state in 
particular—may enforce the rights of individuals. 
 On a narrow choice-protecting conception of enforcement rights, others are permitted to 
enforce a person’s rights only when she grants them permission. I shall now identify how the 
hybrid conception of rights (sketched above) can make it permissible for others to enforce a 
person’s rights under a broader range of conditions. Suppose that you steal my wallet and knock 
me temporarily unconscious. Alternatively, suppose that you steal my wallet and I haven’t 
realized it yet. Alternatively, suppose that I realize it, but haven’t yet decided whom, if anyone, I 
want to authorize to enforce my rights to recover the wallet. The narrow choice-protecting view 
of enforcement rights under consideration here says that a third party who witnesses the theft, 
and who can easily stop the thief, is not permitted to do so because I have not given my 
permission. This is very implausible. Perhaps there is a broader choice-protecting conception of 
enforcement rights that avoids this implausible result, but I shall not purse this possibility. 
Instead, I shall show that a hybrid conception of enforcement rights can judge third party 
enforcement to be just in these cases. 
On the hybrid conception of rights (with choice-protection lexically prior to interest-
protection), others are permitted to enforce my rights when and only when (1) I have validly 
consented, or (2) I have not validly dissented (i.e., expressed my opposition) and it is not against 
my interests. For these purposes, let us stipulate that enforcing a right (in a particular context in a 
particular way) is not against the right-holder’s interest if and only if the expected wellbeing of 
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the right-holder is at least as great with this particular enforcement as it is without it. (Other 
accounts are, of course possible, but I will assume this one for illustration.13) Note that the 
baseline is—not non-enforcement generally, but rather—non-enforcement by this particular 
person in this particular situation in this particular manner. Thus, for example, the expected 
wellbeing of such non-enforcement takes into account the probabilities that the right will be 
enforced by others (who may do it more effectively). One is not permitted to enforce someone 
else’s rights without consent when someone else is sufficiently more likely to do a better job. 
Assuming that enforcement in the above cases is not against my interests, then the hybrid 
conception holds that others are permitted to enforce my rights in the above kinds of case. 
Although I believe that this is a more plausible account than the narrow choice-protecting 
account, I shall not argue that here. The crucial point is that, if the hybrid conception of rights is 
accepted, a third party—and hence the state—may enforce rights under reasonably broad 
conditions. The right-holder can, of course, renounce the enforcement claim against the rights-
violator—in which case no one may enforce the right. The right-holder can also dissent from 
certain others enforcing the right—in which case they are not permitted to enforce the right. In 
the absence of these two conditions, however, third parties—and the state in particular—may 
enforce the rights of a right-holder when she consents or when (given the absence of dissent) it is 
not against her interest. 
 I shall now discuss a second relevant aspect of enforcement rights. Suppose that you 
violate my rights and owe me $100 compensation. Suppose further that the only way to get you 
to pay me this amount is for someone to track you down and force you to pay up. Suppose that 
the cheapest way of so enforcing my rights costs $50. (For example, perhaps the cheapest way is 
for me to enforce my rights myself and I would pay up to $50 to avoid doing it myself. 
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Alternatively, perhaps someone else is a more efficient enforcer in this case and she would do so 
for no less than $50.) I suggest that the rights-violator has an enforceable duty to pay for these 
enforcement costs. Of course, if she immediately and voluntarily pays the $100 compensation, 
then there are no enforcement costs. If, however, someone, has to spend resources on getting her 
to pay, then the violator is liable for the cheapest (reasonable) way of getting her to pay. Again, 
this is a controversial issue that requires a defense. Although I would defend something in the 
spirit of this position, here I am simply flagging it to explore its implications for the justness of a 
libertarian private-law state. In what follows, I shall assume that violators have a duty to cover 
enforcement costs in addition to a duty to compensate their victims. 
Rights violators, of course, are not always caught, and when they are caught, it is not 
always possible to extract full compensation. Here I shall briefly comment on how these issues 
might be dealt with. I suggest that the payment that may be extracted from apprehended rights-
violators includes payments to cover (when possible) the expected value of the unrecovered 
payments from them. There are many ways of fleshing out this idea, but here is one. Suppose (1) 
that a violator imposes a harm worth $100 and enforcement costs of $20, and (2) that there is (a) 
an 80% chance that the violator will be caught and fully compensate the victim and (b) a 20% 
chance that he will not be caught and will provide no compensation. Given that there is only an 
80% chance of recovering compensation and enforcement costs, in order for the violator to cover 
the full expected costs of his rights violations, we must recover $125 ($100/.8) compensation for 
the victim and $25 ($20/.8) for the enforcer (so that their expected values are $100 and $20 
respectively). This ensures that, where possible, the violator covers the full expected costs that 
she imposes on the victim and the enforcer.14 Of course, it is sometimes not possible for violators 
to fully compensate their victims (e.g., because the victim is dead, suffered an uncompensable 
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harm, or suffered a finite harm that is greater than it is possible for the violator to compensate). 
In such cases, I suggest that the recoverable enforcement payment is the efficient cost of 
maximizing compensation to the victim. One determines, that is, what enforcement expenditures 
will maximize the compensation to the victim (net of enforcement costs) and those expenditures 
are owed to the enforcer. Obviously, these and many further related issues need a thorough 
development.15 Here I am merely identifying them to explore their implications for the justness 
of the state. 
 The core idea is that violators have an enforceable duty to compensate their victims as 
much as possible and to cover the efficient costs of any enforcement procedures that are needed 
to ensure that they do so compensate their victims as much as possible. If this view is accepted, 
then we have a financing mechanism for the state. The state may enforce the rights of citizens 
with their consent or when it is in their interests and they do not dissent. Moreover, the state may 
forcibly extract efficient enforcement costs from rights-violators when it enforces the rights of 
citizens. Of course, the enforcement costs that it may extract are limited to something like the 
cheapest feasible cost. Thus, if the state is inefficient in its enforcement procedures, it will not be 
able to recover the full costs of enforcement. Unless inefficient states receive voluntary 
contributions from individuals, they will not be able to sustain their operations without violating 
the rights of individuals. Efficient states, however, will be able to extract the costs of enforcing 
rights from rights violators. Of course, such states will not always fully enforce rights, since the 
cost to the state of such enforcement may exceed the efficient enforcement payment—either 
because someone else can enforce more efficiently or because the violator cannot fully 
compensate the victim and enforcing beyond some partial level reduces the expected payment 
(net of enforcement costs) to the victim. 
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 A libertarian private-law state, then, can provide enforcement services and forcibly 
extract financing for those services from the rights-violators. I shall now argue that it can also (1) 
redistribute resources to individuals who are disadvantaged through no fault of their own, (2) 
help provide goods and services that the market does not provide adequately, and (3) forcibly 
extract financing for those activities.  
 
V. REDISTRIBUTION 
The modern state often redistributes resources from those who have a lot to those who have little. 
Can a libertarian private-law state do this? Clearly, it cannot (normally) redistribute from all rich 
to all poor, since at least some of the rich may have a libertarian right to those resources. Any 
redistribution will have to be from those who have resources to which they have no libertarian 
right to individuals that have a libertarian right to those resources. We shall now examine some 
different versions of (unilateralist) libertarianism and see what their implications are for just 
redistribution. The key issue concerns what property rights individuals have.  
One version of right-libertarianism is radical right-libertarianism, which holds that 
individuals have the power to appropriate unowned things simply by claiming them (or mixing-
labor with them, etc.). They deny that any further conditions are relevant. In particular, they deny 
the necessity of satisfying any Lockean proviso that enough and good be left for others. There is 
thus no room for the state to redistribute resources to the needy or to finance projects to 
overcome market failures.16 
Lockean libertarianism agrees that individuals have the moral power to appropriate 
unowned things by (for example) claiming them, but it insists that this is conditional on 
satisfying some kind of the Lockean Proviso.17 Different versions of Lockean libertarianism 
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specify different versions of the Lockean Proviso. Nozickean right-libertarianism interprets the 
proviso as requiring that no one be left worse off with the appropriation than she would be if the 
thing were in common use.18 A Nozickean right-libertarian private-law state will thus also 
redistribute resources by taking from those who have appropriated things but not satisfied the 
proviso and transferring them to those who are made worse off by the appropriation. Equal share 
left-libertarianism19 interprets the Lockean Proviso as requiring that no one be worse off than she 
would be if no one appropriated more than an equal share of the competitive value (i.e., based 
on demand and supply) of natural resources. An equal share left-libertarian private-law state 
would thus also redistribute resources from those who have appropriated unowned resources but 
not satisfied this proviso to those who have been left with less than an equal share. Finally, equal 
opportunity (for wellbeing) left-libertarianism20 interprets the Lockean Proviso as requiring 
(roughly) that no one be worse off than she would be if no one appropriated more than is 
compatible with everyone having an equally valuable opportunity for wellbeing. Unlike all the 
previous versions of libertarianism, this version gives greater entitlements to external resources 
to individuals who are disadvantaged in internal resources (such as beauty, intelligence, and 
strength). I shall focus on this version of left-libertarianism.21 
Equal opportunity left-libertarianism (like other versions of libertarianism) comes in 
several variations. Here I will focus on the following version. Agents who do not own any 
natural resources (i.e., who merely use them, but with no rights of exclusive use) have no duty to 
promote equality of opportunity for a good life. If agents appropriate natural resources (i.e. claim 
and acquire rights of exclusive use), however, the rights acquired are conditional on the payment 
of competitive rent for the rights acquired (i.e., the supply and demand equilibrium price for 
those rights in some suitable hypothetical auction or market).22 Moreover, if the rights are later 
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transferred to someone else, the duty to pay such rent is also transferred.23 Ownership of natural 
resources, that is, is always conditional upon the payment of this rent. Finally, the rent payment 
must be used to promote equality of opportunity as much as reasonably possible.24 If, for 
example, an individual has rights over land that have a competitive rent value of $100 per year, 
then she has a duty to promote equality of opportunity as much as is reasonably feasible for her 
with a budget—covering all implementation costs (including her time and effort)—of $100 per 
year. This duty is owed to those individuals who are the beneficiaries of the equality promoting 
payment. The beneficiaries, that is, have a right to such payments—although the right is highly 
qualified and conditional: they have a right to a payment only when it turns out that they are the 
beneficiaries of the most effective way of the promoting equality with the sum in question. These 
rights, like all libertarian rights (we are assuming), are enforceable. As indicated above, the state 
is permitted to enforce these rights with the consent of the holder, or when it is in the holders’ 
interests and she has not dissented from such enforcement.25 
An equal opportunity left-libertarian private-law state thus redistributes resources by 
taking from those who own natural resources but have not fully discharged their equality 
promoting duties relative to the competitive rent owed for the rights they hold. Of course, there 
are significant limitations on the distributive activities of such a state. It does tax income tax or 
wealth other than natural resources. It does not take resources from all rich people nor give them 
to all poor people, since many rich people have fully discharged their equality promoting duties 
and many poor people have had an equal opportunity for wellbeing and simply made bad choices 
or been unlucky in the risks they freely undertook. Moreover, this version of the libertarian 
private-law state redistributes resources in this way only when the beneficiaries have consented 
to the state’s enforcement of their rights or when they have not dissented and it is not against 
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their interests (i.e., enforcement does not decrease their expected benefits). Finally, the state is 
permitted to recoup only the costs of efficient enforcement, and thus, if the state is an inefficient 
enforcer—either in general for certain kinds of rights violations, or for specific cases—it will 
typically not make sense for it to get involved. 
So far, then, I have shown that the state’s enforcement of rights can be just according to 
non-pacifist libertarian theories that allow third parties to enforce rights. The range of cases in 
which this is so will be much broader on versions of libertarianism that adopt a hybrid 
conception of rights (for which consent is not necessary for third party enforcement) rather than 
a narrow choice-protecting conception. Moreover, if enforcers are permitted to extract forcibly 
enforcement costs from violators, then the state, if suitably efficient, can justly finance its 
enforcement activities. Finally, according to equal opportunity left-libertarianism, individuals 
have enforceable rights to a certain level of equality promotion against those who appropriate 
natural resources and the state may justly enforce such rights. 
Let us turn now to our final topic: the justness of the state activities to overcome market 
failures. 
 
VI. OVERCOMING MARKET FAILURE 
Under ideal conditions (e.g., perfectly competitive competition), the market is an efficient 
provider of goods and services. Under other conditions, however, the market is not an efficient 
provider in the sense of Pareto suboptimality: some other feasible arrangement makes some 
individuals better off without making anyone worse off. This is so, for example, where there are 
significant positive externalities (i.e., one person’s use of the good provides benefits to others; 
e.g., vaccinations against contagious diseases) or where the good is non-excludable (i.e., it is not 
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practically feasible to provide the good only to those who pay for it; e.g., national defense). 
These are cases of market failure. 
Of course, the mere fact that the market fails to be efficient does not guarantee that state 
intervention is efficient or even more efficient than the free market. There can be government 
failure as well. It merely opens up the possibility that it may be. Modern states typically 
subsidize a variety of activities for which there is some degree of market failure (e.g., national 
defense, research, education). I shall now show that a libertarian private law state can do the 
same according to equal opportunity left-libertarianism. 
Recall that, according to equal opportunity left-libertarianism, those who appropriate 
have a duty to promote equality of opportunity for wellbeing as much as possible with the 
payment that they owe for the rights that they claim over natural resources. The most natural way 
of understanding this requirement is that appropriators have a duty to promote long-term equality 
of opportunity, and it is this version that I shall consider here. Thus, if investing the sum owed 
for appropriation better promotes long-term equality of opportunity, then individuals have no 
right to receive any benefits from that sum in the short run. Individuals have a right to the 
benefits they would receive if the payments were used efficiently to promote long run equality of 
opportunity.26 
This is particularly relevant because one thing that individuals—and the state—can do is 
invest justly extracted rental payments in ways that increase the competitive rent of natural 
resources and thus increase the rental payments owed in the future. The competitive rent of rights 
over natural resources (e.g., land) is sensitive to the availability and price of various goods and 
services. For example, each of the following features will make land more valuable (all else 
being equal): (1) the presence of effective legal and national defense systems, (2) the presence of 
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low cost and well functioning transportation, communication, energy, and information systems, 
and (3) the presence of healthy, knowledgeable, hardworking, and trustworthy individuals. 
Where markets work well, it is counterproductive (non-equality maximizing) for the state to 
invest funds to provide such goods and services. Where markets work poorly (e.g., because of 
indivisibility in the production of goods, non-excludability of good in exchange, or positive 
externalities in use), however, state investment may be an effective way of promoting long-term 
equality of opportunity. First, the benefits provided by investment in such goods and services 
may sometimes themselves help promote long-term equality (by providing significant benefits to 
the relevantly disadvantaged). Second, and more importantly, such investment, when made 
wisely, will typically increase the total rental payments owed by owners of natural resources by 
more than the cost of the investment. Such investments will, that is, increase the long-run pool of 
funds available for promoting equality of opportunity for wellbeing. Of course, beyond some 
level, such investments will cost more than the increase in rental payments that they generate. 
When this is so, the equal opportunity left-libertarian private-law state will not use rental 
payment for such purposes. 
In general, then, for any given budget, there is often some positive optimal level of 
investment in “market-failure” goods and services with respect to maximizing long term (Pareto 
efficient) equality of opportunity for wellbeing. Individuals who appropriate thus have a duty to 
invest their payments at the appropriate level in such resources, and the state has the duty to do 
so if it justly extracts such payments. This tells us nothing, of course, about what the required 
level of investment is in the real world. It might be small or it might be great. That is an 
empirical question (given the requirements of equal opportunity left-libertarianism). The 
important point here is simply that in principle a libertarian private-law state may indeed—at 
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least sometimes—invest where the market fails. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
I have argued that a state can be just according to libertarianism. The first step was to understand 
justice as a threshold concept that requires respecting rights as much as is reasonably feasible. 
Justice is thus compatible with occasional lapses due to ignorance, reasonable implementation 
errors, etc. The second step was to focus on states that are sufficiently modest in what they 
prohibit and sufficiently reliable in how they enforce those prohibitions. More specifically, we 
focused on states that prohibit only activities that violate libertarian rights, that are reasonably 
cautious in enforcing those prohibitions (and thus rarely use morally excessive force), and that 
do not engage in other activities that violate libertarian rights. Such states are libertarian private-
law states. Although they claim a monopoly on the use of force in their territories, they prohibit 
the use of force only when it violates libertarian rights and they normally (occasional mistakes 
aside) use force only when it violates no libertarian rights. 
Even such states are judged unjust both by radical pacifist libertarianism and by versions 
of libertarianism that hold that third parties are not permitted to enforce someone’s rights. These, 
however, are not very plausible positions, and, in any case, I restricted my attention to versions 
of libertarianism that hold that it is permissible for third parties to help enforce rights with the 
consent of the victim. 
 I then showed how a libertarian private-law state could be reasonably extensive if certain 
additional—undefended, but plausible in my view—assumptions were made. First, if rights are 
understood on the proposed hybrid conception, then the state may enforce the rights of citizens 
even without their consent: it may also enforce their rights when the enforcement is not against 
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their interests and they have not dissented. Second, if violators have a duty to bear the costs of 
any efficient enforcement procedures, then the state has the means to cover the costs of efficient 
enforcement. Third, if we assume (as I do) equal opportunity (for wellbeing) libertarianism, then 
the state may justly use force, where this is efficient, to ensure that those who have rights over 
natural resources pay the competitive rent of the rights that they claim and that these funds are 
used to promote equality of opportunity. Finally, if we assume (as I do) that it is long-run 
equality of opportunity for wellbeing that matters, then the extracted rental payments may be 
partly invested in goods and services that the market fails to provide efficiently—provided that 
the costs of such investments is less than the increase in the rental payments that it generates. 
 Although I believe that each of these assumptions is plausible, I have not attempted to 
defend them. Thus, the implications are modest: They merely show the possibility of some 
version of libertarianism recognizing the justice of significant state activity. The assessment of 
whether such a version of libertarianism is plausible must await another occasion. 
 If my argument is correct, then, almost all forms of libertarianism are compatible with the 
justice of some kind of state, and some forms of left-libertarianism are compatible with a 
reasonably robust state. This does not, of course, mean that any existing state is just on 
libertarian grounds. Indeed, this is clearly not so. Existing states typically tax inappropriately 
(e.g., income taxes), are significantly inefficient in how they use resources, restrict people’s 
freedom against their will for their own benefit (e.g., drug laws and helmet laws), and require 
forced labor for the public good (e.g., jury duty, court testimony, military service). Still, the 
possibility of a libertarian just state—perhaps a robust one—helps show that libertarianism, and 
left-libertarianism in particular, is not a utopian dream.27 
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